IV

DYNAMICS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM
The phrase “anti-Americanism” suggests a set of individual, irrational attitudes toward Americans, U.S. society, or the U.S. government. We can view the matter in a slightly different way, however: in terms of the ideas, images, and theories (or “schemas,” a concept I develop below) held concerning the United States. These ideas might be negative, positive, or relatively neutral. People often hold a number of such ideas. They may be in tension with, or even contradict, one another. Some of these ideas will be more salient at some times rather than others, possibly because of current events. People also may deploy them in strategic fashion to justify their own policies, to formulate a sense of their national identity vis-à-vis features of the United States, or to criticize more general features of today’s world, such as globalization or neoliberalism.

In some parts of the world, people may hold a set of ideas about the United States that have long historical depth and that they consider to have been confirmed by past events. In these cases they may not look for much new information before interpreting an event in terms of their preexisting understandings. In other countries (and the units need not be countries) people may not have such a set of well-formed ideas about the United States, or they may be less accustomed to drawing on such ideas. In these cases they may be more likely to radically revise their ideas in the face of new events.

In this chapter, I explore two cases that differ in the way just described: the long-term images and ideas found in France and the shallower and intermittent
anti-Americanism found in Indonesia. These two cases are perhaps extreme versions of a broader contrast between Europe, where greater time and more contact have fashioned specific and deeply rooted schemas about the United States, and Asia, where contact has been intermittent, knowledge more often indirect, and schemas therefore less well-developed and more subject to sharp shifts. I pay special attention to the ideas and attitudes of Muslims in France and Indonesia. Because France has been given special attention both in this book (Sophie Meunier, chapter 5) and in books that she cites, I devote more of this chapter to Indonesia.

As an anthropologist I look for the particular ways in which people combine and change their ideas about the world in specific settings or events. This general orientation leads me to look to the ways in which actors develop schemas and theories about the United States and to the forms that these schemas take, particularly narrative forms that explain how the world works. This approach leads me to talk less about attitudes and more about positions, concepts, and strategic uses of both. It is largely a rationalist position but one that emphasizes the particular and the shifting natures of these ideas.

Concepts and Evidence

The very topic of “anti-Americanism” challenges my emphasis on the rational and the particular. Looking for common dimensions of statements by people throughout the world inevitably tends to depict anti-Americanism as a coherent and globally distributed phenomenon, as something that is “out there” and that can be measured across countries and followed over time. Adding credibility to this assumption are the strong resemblances across countries in ideas held about the United States. In all world regions one hears similar criticisms of the United States as imperialistic, hedonistic, and insufficiently concerned with the welfare of its own citizens. (One might argue, in accord with pragmatic theories of truth, that these convergences indicate the criticisms’ plausibility.) The typology proposed by Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane in chapter 1 elegantly captures those resemblances.

Yet precisely because anti-Americanism consists of negative images and ideas, it often also serves as an alter image of one’s own country or tradition, and thus retains a diacritic particularism. Actions, values, or institutions imagined as characteristic of the United States can become a convenient or psychologically satisfying object against which public leaders or intellectuals can fashion ideas of how their society ought to look. These processes of negative self-definition invoke anxieties, self-images, and political experiences that are quite specific to each country, and that often form part of broader political or social strategies. Thus we have on the one hand a single, broadly shared set of ideas, images, and complaints—about a materialistic society, imperialistic policies, hypocritical leaders—and on the other hand multiple sets of particular emotions and theories. This dual nature of anti-Americanism permits local actors to develop and draw on this general repertoire of ideas and images in culturally specific and strategically motivated ways.
Types of Evidence

The gap between the global and the particular dimensions of anti-Americanism is widened by a methodological division of labor between multiple-country surveys and single-country histories: the poll and the genealogy. The former add to the sense that there is a social phenomenon “out there” that rises and falls in intensity; the latter underscores the particularistic nature of conceptions of the United States.

Each approach has its strengths. Attitude surveys can track rises and falls in answers to survey questions; if the questions and methods remain constant, they can suggest hypotheses about causal relations between particular events and levels of anti-American sentiment (see Pierangelo Isernia, chapter 3). The Pew Global Attitudes Project studies are good examples of this research. Pew researchers are able to pose interesting questions of their data (for example, between attitudes toward American policies and attitudes toward Americans), and they can track changes over time. However, what they capture is the result of a process whereby a respondent aggregates many different and sometimes conflicting beliefs at the moment a survey taker poses a question—but not how the respondent sorts through his or her ideas (Giacomo Chiozza, chapter 4).

Furthermore, survey research tells us little about the interplay among institutions, broad cultural orientations, and ideas about the United States. We may learn that Muslims in Indonesia and Muslims in Jordan view U.S. gender relations in very different ways, but we cannot go much further than that. What is it about Islamic teachings in the two countries that produce these differences? Are the respondents thinking of different things when they answer? We learn that French and Germans have differing forms and levels of anti-American sentiment but do not learn much more than that. Why does French anti-Americanism seem so stubborn and the German variant less so? Surveys are not really designed to answer such questions; they must be supplemented by other types of study.

We usually turn to studies of specific countries or traditions for answers to those questions. A genealogy (in Michel Foucault’s sense) of anti-Americanism traces links, processes of transmission, and abrupt changes in the objects of study, as in Philippe Roger’s *The American Enemy* (2005), a study of anti-Americanism in France during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This literary approach traces topoi in French travel literature, essays, fiction, and political analysis, identifying the specific lines of transmission from one author to another. It has the virtue of focusing on specific ways of writing about the United States, making few assumptions about the content of anti-Americanism, and indeed allowing for sharp breaks in the main ideas and the emotional content of those ideas. If we had a dozen studies similar to Roger’s, we could begin to undertake historical comparative work on ways of expressing ideas about the United States and processes by which those ideas are transmitted and changed.

The Pew surveys and Roger’s genealogy concern very different objects. How could one translate between the history of a specific image—the barren landscape of New York City in twentieth-century literature, for example—and answers to a survey...
question about the dangers posed by the United States? Furthermore, the anti-American images themselves often are ambivalent: the urban landscape has power but is culture-free; America may be godless but it offers great economic opportunity. How and why do these images take on a specific value? Why do particular people evoke them in specific circumstances and to what ends?

These questions take us back to the concerns that motivate survey research: given a repertoire of negative images, what leads some people to adopt them and others not? But we wish to add: How do these images cohere, how are they deployed? We need to be able to break down broad attitudes into the specific ideas, images, and theories they contain, and the way these ideas are used.

Schemas and Narratives

The notion of a “schema” that Katzenstein and Keohane develop in chapter 1 has been adopted by many in psychology and anthropology as a way to study how people move through the world by drawing on categories. Schemas are sets of representations that process information and guide action. They contain both relatively fixed ideas and ideas that depend on contextual cues. A schema followed by American students in a classroom would contain concepts of teacher and examination and “scripts” for answering questions, but these would be modified in interaction sequences. First-year law students famously must relearn the scripts for questions and answers that they had mastered in college, but this is true for anyone who moves from one institution to another, even within a single society.

In the social sciences, cross-cultural comparative research projects have developed schema-oriented approaches to variation. For example, Michele Lamont and her colleagues have highlighted differences in ideas about worth across countries, across regions within countries, and across social-class lines. In all these cases, differences among individuals are best captured as different weightings of the same bundle of normative qualifiers. All workers value work, for example, but they differ from one place to another in the weightings they give to income, task mastery, and consumption patterns. It is the particular weightings that define that which we often less precisely call “the culture.”

These comparative sociological studies also point to the ways in which schemas are deployed to define one’s identity negatively with respect to some other category of people. The “diacritic” use of schemas about kinds of people draws on the intrinsically negative nature of social schemas. One cannot have a social category schema without distinguishing it from other social categories: my notions of what “upper-class people” are like inevitably involve contrasts, positive or negative, with people of other classes.

How does this approach benefit the study of anti-Americanism? One frequent finding from attitude surveys is that people often hold multiple, conflicting views

1. In psychology, see Rumelhart 1980; in cultural anthropology, see Strauss and Quinn 1997.
2. See especially the collaborative French-American work, Lamont and Thévenot 2000.
about the United States, some positive and some negative (Chiozza, chapter 4). What we take to be overall levels of anti-American sentiment at any one moment is the result of a particular weighting of disparate, sometimes contradictory, schemas. This set may include schemas about American society, about Americans, or about particular policies or public officials. For example, in the eight Muslim-majority countries surveyed before the Iraq invasion, 47 percent of all respondents held positive attitudes toward American ideas of freedom and democracy. Country-specific studies allow us to further disentangle the elements combined in these responses; they include anger at hypocrisy (dragging the overall positive ratings down) and respect for the ideal of rule of law and voting (bringing the ratings up).3

These schemas coexist over time: they do not appear or disappear but rise or fall in salience relative to each other and relative to other concerns. For example, despite overall low approval for the United States, survey respondents continue to mention their admiration for the strength of the rule of law in the United States. This schema forms part of the phenomenon that Katzenstein and Keohane (chapter 1) call “liberal anti-Americanism.” I would analyze this orientation not as a stable type of anti-Americanism but as a combination of several distinct schemas: positive ones, such as that about the rule of law in the United States, and negative ones, such as that about American disrespect for international law. Both schemas can be grounded in extensive knowledge of U.S. policies. I see this sort of complex combining of schemas not as evidence of “ambivalence” but as evidence of the awareness by some people of inconsistencies in U.S. policies and institutions.

Examining anti-Americanism in terms of schemas thus allows us to disaggregate “attitudes” into multiple ideas whose relative degrees of salience shift over time. A second benefit from this approach is that it corrects a tendency to think of these attitudes as irrational. If we analyze anti-Americanism into interconnected images and ideas, we continue to see it as involving biases and stereotypes, but not uniquely so. From a cognitive perspective, at least, anti-Americanism may not be any more irrational than pro-Americanism, liberalism, or a preference for German cinema. All these dispositions can bias our perceptions, and they may short-circuit our calling for more information before making a judgment. But they are not necessarily irrational: they may be the product of well-developed analyses of politics, history, or art.

Schema research also suggests some specific avenues for research into anti-Americanism. Some cognitive researchers argue that certain kinds of categories (e.g., race, ethnicity) are easier to conceptualize than others (e.g., class).4 This finding is interesting for the study of anti-Americanism because researchers frequently note disclaimers among respondents that they object “to the policies not to the people.” Such a distinction draws on two different types of representation, the essentialist (people) and the nonessentialist (policies). The cognitive findings could thus help explain survey and focus group findings. Yet we also note connections between anti-

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3. See, for example, the focus group studies carried out by Charney Research in Morocco, Egypt, and Indonesia, December 1–14, 2004. Charney and Yakatan 2005.

4. For example, Hirschfeld 1996. It is interesting that much of this work has been done by social anthropologists who went to the psychological laboratory and brought their social concerns with them.
Americanism and anti-Semitism. Do we need to distinguish between more or less essentialist forms of anti-Americanism? Such a distinction could be important if it (a) allows us to better explore the implications of cognitive research for politics and (b) points to the different social consequences of racism-like forms of anti-Americanism and policy-focused forms of anti-Americanism.\(^5\)

Cognitively, then, anti-Americanism might consist of two or more very different types of schemas. Some schemas would have to do with types of persons (“Americans”); these schemas are of the type that some cognitive psychologists believe are relatively early to conceptualize. Others would have to do with systems, such as the image of the United States as hedonistic or overly multiculturalist, or with theories about the workings of an imperialistic economy. These schemas might exhibit distinct degrees of malleability, and they would not need to be consistent with one another.

Indeed, cognitive science suggests that the same bits of information might be integrated into two or more distinct schemas but that this “shared use of information” does not bring the schemas together.\(^6\) So, the large number of eyewitnesses to the crash of an airplane into the Pentagon on 9/11 is consistent with and thus verifies the schema that terrorists were behind the attacks on that day. However, the same fact (as mentioned in the best-selling book by Thierry Meyssan, which I will explore later) is also consistent with an opposing schema in which the United States plotted the attacks and is so clever and powerful that it was able to get all those people to bear false witness!

Schemas also tend to be tightly organized internally, with an unchanging architecture. Occupants of positions will be more likely to change than will their relationships. For example, a French schema about authority, one that holds that elites do and should run the country, persists through the Revolution, across oscillations between empire and republic, and through the alternations of Left and Right governments. Its hold on people’s imaginations makes it difficult for them to understand how other countries might be run. This finding suggests that any number of new “facts” about the United States can be assimilated into preexisting schemas, as when people take humanitarian aid to be evidence of designs on the assisted countries.

People often construct schemas in the form of narratives, where they may become cognitively more accessible to actors, and thus easier to transmit and to remember.\(^7\) Sharing these narratives can then be said to constitute a community of narration, within which people can tell each other stories and expect to have their narratives ratified. Together, actors reinforce each other’s sense that they have a good grasp of the world.

Narratives are thus both individual and collective.\(^8\) We “know” things about the world because we read, or hear, or experience something that in most cases already

\(^5\) The research mentioned above would predict that anti-American sentiments that attempt to distinguish between policies and people would slide toward generalizing about people.  
\(^6\) Pascal Boyer, personal communication.  
\(^7\) Bruner 1986.  
\(^8\) Wertsch 2002.
has been mediated or framed by producers of knowledge. We also bring to these acts of knowing templates or frameworks that we have derived from earlier instances of knowing. Knowledge is thus socially-mediated and iterative.

Research on memory shows that actors often construct memories out of what James Wertsch calls “schematic narrative templates”: schemas that underlie narratives and that contain “implicit theories” about how the world works. Narrative analysis involves discerning ways in which actors draw on schematic templates to produce a wide variety of surface-level narratives. Wertsch takes as an example the Russian template of “triumph-over-alien-forces,” which has produced accounts of history from the Mongols to Hitler. Wertsch emphasizes that this ubiquitous template does not lead Russians to deny “facts” but shapes the ways in which they view the motives of historical actors. Furthermore, the quite different stories of history written in the 1990s continue to be shaped by this template, only now the aliens are thought to be internal enemies of the society rather than external enemies.

These narrative templates may be superordinate or subordinate to schemas. They may regulate schematic variation by bringing together schemas from different domains, giving them an overall meaning and limiting the extent of their variation and recombination. Wertsch’s Russian example shows this regulative function with respect to schemas, and it may be that stories of wars and revolutions may typically work in this way, as superordinate to schemas and thus both “regulative” of schemas and “constitutive” of historical understandings (see David Kennedy’s chapter on European narratives about America, which serve to construct schemas). Alternatively, two or more distinct narratives may be constructed out of a single schema: in this case, the schema provides the common source of ideas and theories for alternative narratives.

French Anti-Americanism

These observations suggest that we should look for distinct schemas, possibly organized into narrative templates, that are shared by some number of actors in each country we study. In this chapter I consider anti-American schemas and their uses in France and Indonesia. France probably has the best-established repertoire of ideas and images about the United States, and we would expect that we would find this repertoire used to define and justify French institutions, ideas, and projects. Because Meunier (chapter 5) provides an extensive analysis of French anti-Americanism, I limit my discussion to several specific dimensions of the French case, and in particular the way that actors deploy schemas about the United States to comment on French society and politics.

At least some of the major French schemas about the United States may be inserted into more than one narrative and may be given positive or negative evalua-

9. Ibid., 59–60.
10. Ibid., 93–116.
ations. For example, the idea that the American economy and society are both based on a free-market ideology is not in itself positive or negative. Some writers present this schema in the form of a negative narrative, which brings together Tocqueville’s warnings about excessive individualism, stories of late nineteenth-century robber barons, and contemporary data about the ragged American social safety net. Others present America’s “liberalism” (in the European sense of free-market individualism) in a strongly positive way, as in the writings of Jean-François Revel11 or the pro–free-market writings that came out of France during the 1980s, in the years after Mitterrand’s policies had lost their luster.

The “liberal America” schema is thus neither pro- nor anti-American in itself but is a form of knowledge that is broadly distributed within France and that individual actors may view with enthusiasm, hatred, or, as I believe is the case with the vast majority of French people today, with a combination of positive and negative evaluations: positive with respect to low unemployment and high growth, negative with respect to the weak system of social support, and so forth. Many in France see with some regret that their society may move in a liberal direction. They may see that move as inevitable in order to counter the looming expenses of the safety net and the high rates of unemployment, but they may also fear the consequences for the sense of responsibility the French have for one another.

In these discussions, “liberal America” serves as a pole of reference for discussions about France. French evaluations of that schema vary across individuals and over time, and the schema may be internally dissected and parts of it assigned different evaluations, but the schema remains relatively stable. This example (and, indeed, the shift to “schemas” as an analytical tool) suggests the value of taking as our object the broad set of schemas about the United States, and not just schemas that have a negative value. Once we take that step, then “anti-Americanism” starts to look like a set of internally complex schemas.

We Are Not an “Anglo-Saxon” Society

Let us consider the “diacritic” use of schemas in more detail. In France, many studies of political theory and political institutions contrast France to “Anglo-Saxon societies.” The negative features of the latter justify the contrasting features of French society. In these works, “Anglo-Saxon” means not common law and habeas corpus but a regrettable tendency toward multiculturalism or “communalism” (communau-
tarisme) in both social life and political theory. In these strategic uses, the trope is less a theory about the United States and Britain than it is a shorthand way to refer to features that would be, or are, undesirable in France.

In my own interviews for a project on French ideas about religion and the state, intellectuals and public officials inevitably invoked “Anglo-Saxon societies” in this contrastive way, not with an elitist sneer but as a cool analytic attempt to point to a “French exception.” (Generally, and intriguingly, references to legal or philosophical

differences were to Britain, but references to the social and cultural consequences were to the United States.)

For example, in 2003, political philosopher Blandine Kriegel (who once ran a Maoist cell but now serves as an adviser to President Jacques Chirac on the integration of immigrants in France) explained to me the nature of the social contract in France by contrasting French laïcité (roughly, “secularity”) to the “Anglo-Saxon” idea of freedom of religion: “In Anglo-Saxon thinking, in Locke or Spinoza, it is the concrete individual who has rights; freedom of conscience is the foundation. In our tradition these liberties are guaranteed through political power, which guarantees a public space that is neutral with respect to religion.” She went on to describe the importance of religious neutrality in the public sphere, and ended with the declaration that “there will never be Sikh civil servants in France!” Here she referred to the much-publicized British cases in which Sikhs, whose religious norms require them to keep their hair uncut and covered, had won the right to keep their turbans on even while working for the government.

This diacritical and negative reference to “Anglo-Saxon” thinking proved very useful for politicians in justifying the March 15, 2004 law against wearing religious signs in public schools. The law goes well beyond the 1905 law stipulating that the state would not favor or subsidize churches, and beyond the general political idea that political life should not be based on religious referents. The 1905 law and the relevant jurisprudence state that civil servants, including public school teachers, may not display their religious affiliations. The new law expands the obligation to include students. In the debates on the law at the National Assembly in February 2004, the deputies who favored the law had to find new grounds for this law. It was rhetorically important that they be able to point to mirror images of the French model in order to redefine the legal bases for that model. The most useful foil was the “Anglo-Saxon” model. They characterized this model as one in which society was a composite of distinct communities, with little or no obligation to work or live together, and where each community closed in on itself. This characterization was also applied to some Muslim communities in France. The United States, and certain communities within France, shared this feature of privileging narrow group interest over the general interest of society.12

More broadly, many French criticisms of U.S. ways of living, as opposed to policies, have to do with worries about French ways of living, and are really about broad challenges to sovereignty that have to do with globalization and Europeanization as much as with America. Current debates about whether the French should work more than they do often invoke the contrast with American work habits (as well as contrasts within Europe). The United States provides a particularly salient set of symbols for general social and economic processes. Choosing to attack an American symbol may also rally more people than would an attack on a French one. When José Bové and his followers tore down a partially built McDonald’s restaurant in Millau in southern France, they were protesting broad economic processes that threatened

small farmers and threatened an agriculture based on local products cultivated on local soil. They also were continuing in a long history of Larzac-area protests against actions by the French state that contradicted the interests of local farmers. The marketing policies of a large conglomerate such as Carrefour probably have a greater direct effect on these farmers and on French purchasing habits than does the presence and activities of the McDonald’s chain. But attacking a salient symbol of American economic imperialism, culinary homogenization, and unhealthy food attracted more popular support than attacking a grocery store chain where many French people prefer to do their shopping.

The Real Causes of 9/11

Although one can find conspiracy theories almost anywhere, an interesting facet of French theories is the way in which they are given extensive and often uncritical media treatment. This treatment supports the idea that these theories about how the United States works show up because of a consistent anti-American bias for such theories. French television stations and newspapers are run by a tightly interlocking network of intellectuals and producers, a structural condition that promotes consistent media biases.

Let me offer an especially striking example that nonetheless shows the general nature of the problem. In 2002, the French left-wing activist Thierry Meyssan wrote *L’effroyable imposture*, whose thesis was that the claim that Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon on 9/11 was a fabrication by the U.S. government (which also had planted explosives in the base of the World Trade Center), designed to legitimate an invasion of Afghanistan for reasons of security, the control of oil pipelines, and domestic politics. The book quickly became the top nonfiction best seller and difficult to find. Throughout 2002 and 2003, French non-Muslim and Muslim friends of mine urged me to read it to discover the truth about 9/11.

The French media critic Daniel Schneiderman points to the television reception given this book as a prime example of the “media nightmares” increasingly characteristic of France. He singles out Thierry Ardisson of France 2 as “incarnating the infiltration of the logics of information marketing in public media, the channel France 2.” Although all media compete desperately with each other for advertising dollars, the competition particularly affects France 2, a station that has a public mandate but must compete with totally private stations for its audience. Consequently, France 2 has not only to devote time to its mission of public service but also rather frantically looks for ways to attract viewers from the privatized TF1. France 2 thus has a very “bimodal” distribution of programs, including hours of Sunday morning programs on religions, on the one hand, and more exposé shows than any other station, on the other. Ardisson’s show *Tout le monde en parle* (Everyone Is Talking about It) is frequently the first place where the latest accusations are aired. Such was the case for Thierry Meyssan’s claims. Schneiderman shows how during the program

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Ardisson sometimes took Meyssan’s side against detractors, working to keep the interest of the viewers, and failed to bring up the most telling set of facts others had cited against the conspiracy theory, namely, that many witnesses testified to seeing the plane crash.14

Although serious journalists eventually took on the claims, and rebuttal books were published by other French authors (followed by a second book by Meyssan), the argument’s widespread appeal among ordinary French people needs to be explained. The book set out a logical argument that fit a schema about U.S. imperialist designs on the world. Many French writers and public intellectuals agree with one or more versions of this schema—Michael Moore is very popular in France. Some of these intellectuals have focused on the work of Leo Strauss as the key to a properly systematic and theoretical understanding of American neoconservatives, in particular those politicians and intellectuals associated with the Project for the New American Century. The Project’s publications advocate a strong military presence in much of the world but particularly the Middle East.15 Its founding members include William Kristol, Richard Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle. Some of those French intellectuals who read, or knew of, these publications took them to support the accusations made by Meyssan. Meyssan’s book fits with this schema, even if it is not implied by it, nor sustainable on its own.

This example points up the difference between theories and biases. The theory that a combination of oil interests and neoconservative messianism lay behind the invasion of Iraq fits with quite a bit of evidence and thus is a theory well worth entertaining. Looking into or accepting such a theory is not a sign of anti-Americanism. Meyssan’s claims, however, go well beyond this (or any other worthwhile) theory. A wide array of readers accepted claims that ignored the testimony of many onlookers only because they had taken on a degree of bias against American policies that obviated the need for strong evidence and well-reasoned arguments. In other words, the book was a best seller because it built both on reasonable theories about American policies and on strong biases among many French readers that led them to accept Meyssan’s wild claims.

Other theories about 9/11 also circulated, although they would not have been aired in best sellers or on television. I heard theories that Jews were to blame for the attacks, either in the form of Israeli agents or through their control of the U.S. government. In the latter case, the Jewish conspiracy theories supplemented the Meyssan claims. Indeed, I heard considerable support for Meyssan’s arguments by Muslim friends, who sometimes would add, briefly, a reference to the Jewish responsibility theories, usually the canard that “none of the Jewish workers showed up for work that day.”

Muslim schemas about Jewish control of the media in France and the United States do not appear in surveys about French anti-Semitism, but they are deeply held.

15. Its September 2000 white paper on military strategy (Donnelly 2000) was very influential in shaping subsequent United States policy statements on military strategy.
Let me offer one example of how they surface. One Muslim teacher, a close acquaintance of mine, who has been especially vocal in denouncing anti-Semitism, was discussing why a certain television program portrayed Muslims in a bad light. He said that the producer's name was such-and-such, and then let his voice drop. I was supposed to perceive that it was a Jewish name and that this would explain the tone of the program. Nothing was “said,” but the information that explained everything had been communicated.

These two schemas—American imperialism, Jewish media control—are distinct and not necessarily consistent with each other, but they can be and are held at the same time by a certain number of Muslims and by some non-Muslims in France. They also coexist with other schemas that are not at all anti-American, and these have to do with the “three-way” nature of references made to the United States by Muslims in Europe. Muslims in Europe deal most proximally with French or German or Italian governments, and their attitudes toward conditions of life in the United States, as distinct from U.S. foreign policy, are conditioned by those existentially prior encounters and struggles. Since 2002 public life in France has had an increasingly anti-Islamic flavor, occasioned by a government and media campaign to blame poor schools and a breakdown in social life on Islamic extremism, which supposedly infiltrates France by way of young Muslims in poor suburbs, and shows up when they force girls to wear head scarves. During the riots that swept French cities in fall 2005, some French politicians first blamed radical Muslims, before the secret police made it clear that there was no connection between Islamism and the riots.16

In this context the conditions of life for Muslims in the United States look pretty good to French Muslims. Many Muslim leaders in France have contacts with friends in the United States, and they are very aware of daily life there. They talk about the greater ease with which American Muslims organize, wear their head scarves, find ways to sacrifice on id al-Kabir, and so forth. One teacher in whose class on Islamic ethics I sat often strongly criticized the United States for its policies and in class would ask me to explain those policies, but in response to a student’s use of “the West” (in October 2001, mind you) he said:

I don’t follow those who oppose “Islam” to “the West,” who explain things by saying that “it is because we Muslims did such and such that the West did such and such” or vice versa. Things are all mixed together now; for example in the laboratories where they create airplanes and other things in the U.S., you have people from all over the world, a true mixing of all people from throughout the world.

For many Muslims in France, strong criticism of U.S. foreign policy, theories of Jewish influence on that policy, appreciation of religious freedom in the United States, and approval of international scientific and religious cooperation with the United States can all coexist. We learn more about these and other groups of people if we examine them as holding complex collections of schemas concerning the

United States, only some of which exhibit the properties that would lead us to call them anti-American.

The French case thus points to ways in which broadly held and long-held schemas about the United States underlie ways of thinking about one’s own society. These schemas are not all necessarily anti- or pro-American but serve to demarcate one way of life from another. They may be deployed in order to justify specific policies or to explain particular events in the world. In those actions of justification and explanation, they may be combined with other schemas. Public actors are able to use these schemas successfully precisely because many in France have made them part of their repertoires of concepts for understanding and evaluating what happens in the world around them.

**Indonesian Anti-Americanism**

Schemas about America are more central to French projects of self-definition and justification than to the corresponding Indonesian projects. I often hear Indonesians comment on individualism and violence in the United States in order to argue that Indonesian society is more humane. But these diacritic references to the United States are casual, often as part of a remark about a violent, imported television program. They are less important to Indonesian self-definition than are claims about the ability of Indonesians to live together without losing their cultural differences.

Related to this relatively shallow function of American schemas is the fact that Indonesia has shown the most extreme shifts in responses to questions about attitudes toward the United States of all Muslim countries. In 2002 61 percent of Indonesians surveyed in a Pew Global Attitudes Project study had “favorable” attitudes toward the United States, but one year later, after the invasion of Iraq, that number had dropped to 15 percent. After the American response to the tsunami in early 2005, sentiment changed sharply once again. A February 2005 survey found that negative opinion had dropped from 2003’s 83 percent to 54 percent, and that the percentage expressing confidence in Osama bin Laden fell from 58 percent to 23 percent.17

We can think of a variety of explanations for the sharp nature of these swings relative to experiences in other countries. The Iraq invasion kicked off the rise and the tsunami explains the fall of anti-Americanism. But the amplitude of the swings requires other explanations. If it is simply the case that anti-Americanism is weak or superficial, could not one just as plausibly predict very mild responses to surveys, with lots of “don’t knows”?

**Direct and Indirect Anti-American Schemas**

One starting point for an explanation may lie in making a new distinction, between schemas that are explicitly and solely about the United States and those that are, or

17. Lembaga Survey Indonesia results reported in *Singapore Straits Times*, March 7, 2005.
can be seen as relevant to judging the United States but are directly about other issues. We can think of these two kinds of schemas as “direct” and “indirect” with respect to the United States.

Until recently, only indirect anti-American schemas have been widely diffused in Indonesia. These schemas concern Jewish plots, stories about forced Christianization, and narratives of the decline of the Muslim world. Obviously these three schemas can be linked to the United States, but often they exist on their own. Criticisms of U.S. one-sided policies in the Middle East also have a long life, but they have not been linked to everyday concerns in Indonesia. Only the interference by the CIA in Indonesian domestic affairs produced widely held directly anti-American sentiment, and it was perhaps balanced by knowledge of previous U.S. support for Indonesian independence.

In addition, many Indonesians have held positive views of the United States. A recent focus group study brought out the support for the greater role of the rule of law in the United States than in Indonesia. As one young Indonesian man said, “They obey the rules compared to our people, who usually ignore rules.” In studying Indonesian law, I have spoken with a great many Indonesian judges, lawyers, and clients, who invariably contrasted the corruption of the Indonesian legal system with the perceived transparency and fairness of the U.S. system.

Things have changed over the past eight to ten years, however. U.S. foreign policy has given credibility to new, direct anti-American views. These have to do with U.S. hostility toward Islam and Muslims, now functioning as schematic narrative templates that generate theories, often “conspiracy theories,” and provide a negative spin to any event. For example, after the Bali bombing in October 2002, Indonesian vice president Hamzah Haz suggested that U.S. agents might have been responsible. Sidney Jones, head of the International Crisis Group’s Indonesia project, reported that ordinary Indonesians, mostly mainstream Muslims, said the same, that the United States had engineered the blast to win sympathy for America. Many of these people were reacting against the pressure brought to bear by the United States on Indonesia and the Philippines to “step up” the war on terror and against the already looming invasion of Iraq.

But what is interesting about these theories is that they are of a piece with other ideas that have nothing to do with Islam or Muslims. These ideas are generated by a schema in which the United States is assumed to always work for its own economic and political interests and against those of Indonesians. This schema knits together a number of otherwise unrelated claims, including, among others, (1) the notion that the United States, working with Australia, had brought about East Timor’s independence, a loss deeply felt by many Indonesians; (2) the claim that the United States had somehow brought on the economic crisis of 1997; and (3) the opinion that although the United States did intervene to help Indonesians after the

tsunami, Americans had known about the tidal wave in time to alert Indonesians but did nothing. This last argument is plausible (many Americans also have wondered why local authorities could not have been alerted) and fits the “imperialist schema.”

In Indonesia, the more deeply anchored schemas are probably of the “indirect” sort, and in fact they could be considered to be “narrative templates” of the sort described by James Wertsch for Russia: those that have a long life and serve to regulate the content of new schemas.20 Within Indonesian Muslim circles, two broadly distinguishable narrative templates vie for supremacy. One draws from the writings of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan ul-Muslimin) in Egypt and elsewhere and emphasizes the moral primacy of Islamic allegiances over particular nationalisms. A second narrative emphasizes broad processes of secularization and distinguishes the domain of religion from that of politics. The first can become anti-Semitic and anti-American; the second is strongly pluralistic and can be quite pro-Western.

These two templates coexist in the minds (and writings) of a number of Indonesian intellectuals and probably among many other Muslims in Indonesia. This commingling theory makes sense of polling and focus group data and of the statements of many “moderate” Muslim intellectuals over the years. It also helps explain why attitude surveys can exhibit such rapid rises and falls in levels of anti-Americanism.

These templates have their histories in the “intellectual pilgrimages” of Indonesian Muslims. Beginning in the late 1960s, Muslim leaders who had wished Indonesia to adopt Islamic law for Muslims (many of them associated with the political party Masjumi or the activist organization Dewan Dakwa Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), under the leadership of Muhammad Natsir) moved close to the Muslim World League. The League provided funds for the DDII to sponsor students who wished to study in the Middle East. Natsir sent students to Saudi Arabia, where they learned the ideas and methods of the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin, especially the methods of neighborhood-based *dakwa* or “call” to Muslims to return to proper Islam. These methods were reproduced in Indonesia and influenced a new generation of dakwa activists. Intellectuals and activists returning from these DDII pilgrimages began to translate the works of Ikhwan founder Hassan al-Banna, as well as works by contemporary thinkers such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi.21 During the 1980s, the number of Indonesian students in Saudi Arabia and Egypt rose sharply, nearing one thousand in each country, but these were mainly undergraduates; the Islam they returned with was learned in Brotherhood circles or discussion groups. It tended to include strong denunciations of Israel and of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

In contrast with this Arabia-Cairo pole were the smaller numbers of more highly trained intellectuals sent to universities in North America from the late 1960s. Some, such as Amien Rais and Inaduddin Abdulrahim, were active in the dakwa movement. Others, such as Djalauddin Rahmat and the late Nurcholis Madjid, are better

21. See Latif 2004 for an excellent discussion of these influences.
thought of as public intellectuals. The longer story of these intellectual pilgrimages includes the founding of the Islamic universities (IAINs), and the effect of the “liberal” orientation of Mukti Ali, minister of religious affairs in the 1970s, who sent students for postgraduate training in religious studies to North America, especially to McGill and the University of Chicago. These students were supposed to return with pragmatic ideas about Islam that could fit with technocratic ideas about society and development—and some did.

Some of these figures bridged these increasingly divergent communities and drew on both narrative templates. For example, Amien Rais and Syafi’i Ma‘arif developed close ties with the DDII but then received their degrees under “liberal” teachers at Chicago. They kept both the Middle Eastern-Ikhwan schemas and the North American-liberal schemas at work in their minds. Amien Rais could preach a pluralist version of Islam consistent with his training at the University of Chicago. But on his return to Indonesia in 1978 he wrote in a mainstream reformist magazine that it was unfortunate that he had to study about Islam with Jews. He singled out his own dissertation supervisor.

The coexistence of these very different “schematic templates” about Islam, religion, and the United States show up in many different contexts. They are even more striking in neighboring Malaysia because of the higher income levels and long-term exposure to European and North American training. In the most sophisticated scholarly bookstores, the best-seller shelves look very much like those you would see in an American city, but next to the latest New York Times list and scholarly works in sociology and political science one discovers new editions of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Henry Ford’s “The International Jew,” and Mein Kampf—the last intended not for historical study but as a continuingly relevant set of observations on how the world works.

Anti-American Narratives

As our concern here is primarily anti-American ideas, let me turn to two articles published in two Islamic magazines and on their respective Internet sites to illustrate how anti-American narratives draw on a wide variety of schemas. Persatuan Islam claims a heritage from the reformist writers and teachers of the 1920s and 1930s, in particular Ahmad Hassan, whose books explaining the reformist or modernist (kaum muda) approach, inspired by Muhammad ‘Abduh, were distributed throughout Indonesia in the years before World War II and have continued to be reprinted and distributed. The movement and thus the publications have a broad following. Sabili is a more recent entry into Indonesia Islamic publishing. It takes a relatively hard line on international issues. Sabili translates Internet articles on foreign affairs and publishes them, or excerpts them with commentary by Indonesian Muslim writers and scholars. It is distributed outside mosques all over Indonesia and read by many Muslims.

In an article from September 2003, published first in Sabili and then reprinted in Persatuan Islam, a journalist analyzes the “Anti-American Tidal Wave” (the title of the
The rhetoric is one of a global surge in opposition to the United States in Europe, among Muslims, and by East Asians. The analysis is sophisticated: Korea opposes the U.S. crusade for free trade, Europeans resent American dominance, Muslims dislike the one-sided approach to the Middle East, and so forth. An editor of Die Zeit is quoted as saying that it was the Iraq invasion that started the “wave of hate” against the United States. The Pew Global Attitudes Project results are presented. A history of Middle East opposition is set out in which Osama bin Laden’s “movement” appears among many others, most of longer duration.

A second Sabili article, from June 2003, analyzes the anti-Muslim prejudice of Americans, citing American journalists for its main points: Americans only know the rest of the world from films, they sent hate mail to Muslims after 9/11, and so forth. The writer asks why those who write hatefully of Islam, from Samuel Huntington to Daniel Pipes, are listened to more than are writers such as John Esposito who urge cooperation with Islam. The answer, we learn, lies in the list of members of the Council for Foreign Relations, whose ranks include both Huntington and neoconservatives, many of whom are Zionists. From there the article slides into citations of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the plan that lies behind the writings of Paul Wolfowitz (who was U.S. ambassador to Indonesia before joining the Defense Department) and others. It closes with a long analysis by a “da’wa specialist,” who reminds readers of the battle of Badr, when only 313 Muslims under Muhammad’s leadership defeated far superior Meccan forces.

These articles are typical in the schemas they evoke: God’s plan for Muslims’ victory, the Jewish-Zionist conspiracy to dominate the world, in alliance with powerful Jewish and Christian Americans; Muslims’ opposition to this domination through a number of convergent political movements; and the hatred created by the United States through its unilateral actions. Much of the analysis is sophisticated. Major political analysts in the United States and Europe are cited, and then their views are extended by Indonesian analysts, who add the bits about the Protocols and the Islamic historical parallels. Narratives familiar to the magazine’s readers—the battle of Badr, the rise of Osama bin Laden in opposition to the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia—are merely referred to, on the assumption that readers will fill in the details. This kind of writing potentially has a very broad appeal: more educated readers appreciate the wide reading behind the article; Muslims of all types respond to the linking of the battle of Badr, a key historical point of pride, to today’s struggles.

“Jews” as an explanatory category is very much in the air, despite the absence of Jews from Indonesia and Indonesia’s distance from the site of Jewish-Muslim conflicts. Focus groups held in Indonesia, Egypt, and Morocco elicited very similar comments, pointing up the degree to which the schema about Jewish control over U.S. affairs has spread:

Americans are mostly Jews. (older Indonesian man) Most Americans are Jewish. The richest person is Jewish. (America’s) population, most are Jewish. Their religion is Jewish too. (young Indonesian woman) The real Americans are the Indians, but those who immigrated to the U.S. are Jewish. (older Moroccan woman) I think Christians and Jews are equal [in numbers in America but] Jews have wider influence. (older Indonesian woman)

These statements might suggest a degree of ignorance on the part of these Muslims; a short piece by *New York Times* reporter Jane Perlez provides a very different idea. Perlez visited an Islamic school (pesantren) in Kalimantan (the island of Borneo), and quotes a student, called Muhammad in the article, as saying “I know from very deep in my heart, the United States is evil.” His questions to Perlez revealed his relatively sophisticated schema for understanding the world: “‘Why is Milosevic a violator of human rights, but Ariel Sharon is not?’ Sharon, he went on, ‘killed a lot of people when he was head of the Israeli Army.’ Why, asked Muhammad, was ‘George Soros, the Hungarian Jew, such a rich man?’”

Responses to 9/11 and the 2005 Tsunami Relief Effort

The aftermath of 9/11 provides important tests for the presence of anti-American bias, as does the American response to the 2004 tsunami. Gareth Barkin’s analysis of Indonesian television coverage of the attacks of 9/11 concludes that (i) the major stations paid little attention to the evidentiary questions of who attacked and how, and that (2) they privileged coverage of anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States and ignored President Bush’s and New York mayor Rudy Giuliani’s admonitions to Americans to avoid anti-Muslim prejudice.

Indonesian media responses thus fit the conditions outlined by Katzenstein and Keohane (chapter 1) for anti-American bias. Journalists reported different opinions about the causes of the attacks and did not try to sift out “the truth.” Indonesian media also reminded viewers many times that Americans had wrongly accused Muslims of perpetrating the Oklahoma City bombings, reminders that, according to Barkin, may explain why in one magazine readers’ poll, 46 percent of respondents claimed that the 9/11 attacks were done by Americans.

Anti-Semitic schemas were quickly activated after 9/11 in mainstream Islamic publications. *Republika* is a daily newspaper with high production values that developed as part of efforts in the late Suharto period to create a state-sponsored Muslim think tank. It takes self-consciously Islamic rather than more broadly Indonesian positions on issues but tries to attract and hold a broadly based Muslim readership. Right after 9/11, however, an editorial in the newspaper emphasized that the attacks were on “symbols of U.S. greatness [kejayaan].” The writer says that he will “put aside who

really masterminded the bombing” and instead focus on “New York as a city of Jews and a symbol of U.S. greatness.” After describing the close relationship of Jews and the United States, the author predicts that the United States will attack a “scapegoat.”

Given this argument, it is not surprising that in a survey conducted for Republika between the attacks on the World Trade Center and the first attacks on Afghanistan, when asked who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, 43 percent of the respondents said “anti-U.S. forces” but 34 percent said “radical Jews.” In addition, 48 percent of respondents predicted that if the United States were to attack Afghanistan, U.S. forces would be wiped out. Barkin reminds readers that Republika’s positions and the opinions of its readers were more moderate than those of more extreme publications (such as Sabili).

Indeed, after the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan, it became difficult for Muslim groups to support the call for jihad against the United States. The Majelis Ulama Indonesian, a national council of Muslim scholars drawn from the major, mainstream Muslim groups (mainly Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama), called for jihad in late September 2001. When pressed, individual members of the organization fell back on the idea that jihad takes many forms, and condemned attempts to single out American tourists for violent action. Vice President Hamzah Haz, whose power base was with Muslim groups outside the two largest organizations, took on the mantle of defending Muslims, and opposed President Megawati Sukarnoputri support for the U.S.-led “war on terror.”

“Moderate” Muslims, including many educated in the United States, subscribe to theories about the United States that we might wish to cite as evidence of anti-American attitudes. The quite “moderate” and English-language Jakarta Post (September 10, 2003) stated that “moderate” Indonesian Muslims “know very well” that the Afghanistan campaign was part of a long-standing “Bush and Co.” plan to build an oil pipeline through Central Asia, and that oil also motivated the attack on Iraq.

The Indonesian response to the U.S. attack on Afghanistan also is supported by nationalism and resentment at outside meddling in Indonesian affairs. The arrest and trial of Abu Bakar Bashir, accused of heading Jemaah Islamiyah (labeled by the United States as a terrorist organization), was due to substantial U.S. pressure. It came not that long after (in Indonesian memories) the successful independence of East Timor, which was celebrated by most of the world but bitterly resented by most Indonesians as a loss of territory. The resentment was directed first and foremost at Australia, but the U.S. role in that conflict, in the 1965–66 massacres of “communists” (in which the role of the CIA was more fully revealed only recently), and in its post-9/11 pressures to arrest “fundamentalists,” contributed to an overall picture of U.S. interference, now colored by a growing sense of U.S. opposition to Islam (a sense entirely absent in the 1980s, when I lived in Jakarta and Aceh).

As recently as the middle of 2001 it would have been unthinkable for the leaders of Indonesia’s two major Muslim organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, to publicly decline invitations to come to Washington, as did those leaders in January 2003 on grounds that they were offended by the Bush policy on Iraq. The Muhammadiyah leader, A. Syaffi Ma’arif, received his PhD from the University of Chicago; both are quite justly called “moderate” Muslim leaders in their efforts to develop pluralist forms of Islam in which Muslims of different schools can coexist, and to ensure that Indonesia remains a nonconfessional state in which Christians, Buddhists, and others can coexist with Muslims. That their refusal may have been mainly or even entirely required given the attitudes of their respective memberships only attests to a radical change in those attitudes. (That October they were able to tell President Bush in Bali that U.S. policies were a main cause of terror attacks.)

Indeed, our general sense that Indonesia stands for “moderate Islam” may need to be refined by looking at the dimension of receptivity to Western ideas. Here, Indonesians, perhaps because of less close interaction with European or American institutions, may be less receptive than other Muslim-majority countries. In the Pew survey, Indonesia was alone among the nine Muslim populations surveyed that had a (slim) majority, 53 percent, say that “democracy” would not work in their country because it was a Western way of doing things.

In the wake of the 2004 tsunami and the 2005 U.S. aid effort, Indonesian opinions shifted sharply once more. Most reporting on the effects of tsunami aid on world opinion has emphasized the rise in positive estimates of the role of the United States. In Indonesia as elsewhere (Katzenstein and Keohane, chapter 1), the aid given by the U.S. government to victims of the tsunami in Aceh met with widespread public approval.

However, writings about the aid have continued to be shaped by schemas about the negative role of the United States in the world. These negative shadings of stories show the continued presence of an anti-Americanism bias. Persuatuion Islam, on January 24, 2005, warned that foreign presence and foreign loans to Aceh for reconstruction might lead to foreign influence in what always had been known as the “Veranda of Mecca” for its strong commitment to Islam. But the article combines distinct, if not incompatible, evaluations of the United States. America is not giving enough aid compared to its earnings from Acehnese natural resources and should give more, says the author. But U.S. contributions are given in order to extract profit and make money through interest on loans. In any case, “foreign agents are running around” in Aceh, perhaps planting espionage devices.

The post-tsunami aid discussions have brought up not only anti-American biases but strategic uses of the idea of anti-Americanism by U.S. groups. This phenomenon exists whenever reasoned criticism of U.S. policies is dismissed as merely another instance of anti-Americanism. But in the U.S. Christian press, Indonesian resistance to U.S. tsunami aid itself was seen as anti-Americanism. Christian missionaries saw a duty and perhaps an opportunity after the tsunami to save lives and souls in Sri Lanka and Aceh. One of their ideas was to place orphans in Christian homes, an
idea that ran against Indonesian ways of thinking for two reasons: a fear of Chris-
tian conversion through adoption (precisely what the missionaries intended) and a
long-standing reliance in Indonesia on orphanages run by Muslim associations. The
negative reaction led to a headline on an evangelical web-site, “Indonesia’s Anti-
American Stance Hinders Foreign Tsunami Aid.”

“Episodic” Anti-Americanism

Unlike the Russian one-size-fits-all narrative template of “triumph over alien forces”
described by James Wertsch, Indonesian schemas concerning the United States are
varied and not necessarily consistent. U.S. actions are said to be motivated by the
desire to secure oil revenues, to spread Christianity, or to work for the interests of
Israel. The United States is seen as controlled by Jews or respectful of the rule of
law and religious freedom. The two articles from Sabili I presented above do not
neatly organize these various schemas into one consistent narrative. Indonesians do
have such narratives—about the participation of all social groups in the struggle for
independence, for example. President Suharto spent a lot of time and money trying
to get Indonesians to internalize another narrative template, that the army saved
Indonesia from the Communists by its slaughters in 1965–66.

Americans and America are not entirely absent from these narratives, but they do
not play major roles. The salience of a schema about the United States is much more
episodic, the result of specific events. After the Iranian Revolution one saw lots of
anti-U.S. banners. These faded away but returned after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It
may be that the long-term fighting over Palestine has “ratcheted up” anti-American
feeling such that it now has a somewhat higher floor than before, especially as those
who adhere to the Muslim Brotherhood narrative have now become more active in
schools and training institutes than was the case in the 1970s. But compared with the
Middle East or France, anti-American schemas are of recent vintage and are not
central to Indonesian narratives about their own past (on the Middle East, see Marc
Lynch, chapter 7). They also tend to be accompanied by sentiments of anger and
disillusionment rather than hatred.

Schemas about the United States may be more important as elements in episodes
of political conflict. The sudden arrival of U.S. ships off the coast of Banda Aceh a
relatively short time after the tsunami (and before any significant response by the
Indonesian government) made salient a schema about a generous and powerful
America, but even more dramatically it highlighted within Indonesia the Indonesian
state’s brutality toward the Acehnese. The event quickly raised levels of approval for
the United States, in part because it placed into stark contrast the response of the
two governments, a contrast frequently made by Acehnese in personal communica-
tions to me or in unguarded comments to journalists.

The narrative templates followed by producers of television programs and editors of newspapers probably need to be analyzed in other terms, however: by their sense of their viewer or reader “base” and the limitations on how they are allowed by the state or by pressure groups in the society to depict events in the world. Television stations and newspaper offices were attacked in the early 2000s for stories said to be offensive to Muslims, events that partially explain the bias in coverage of 9/11 noted by Barkin. Unlike al-Jazeera (Lynch, chapter 7), Indonesian television stations and newspapers plot their production strategies with domestic consumers in mind and are less likely to take risks. It may be that an anti-American narrative template concerning the Middle East now has reached the point where it filters stories in at least some of these national news outlets.

Schemas, Diacritics, and Regions

Indonesian and French schemas about the United States share some elements, including a fear of imperialism and a dislike of arrogance, but overall they contrast strikingly in content and in function. Some of the differences are due to Indonesia’s large Muslim majority, which shares with many other countries concerns about the oppression of Muslims and attacks on other Muslim-majority countries. But more important for comparative purposes is the different roles played by schemas about the United States in each country’s public life, and the differences in the strategic deployment of anti-American schemas.

The United States and France each has a repertoire of schemas about the other that can be deployed for a range of purposes, from rallying against a cultural enemy to defining each country’s own identity. Indonesia and the United States have no such reciprocal image repository to draw on. When Indonesian public figures do invoke images of the United States, those images have little to do with Indonesia. Conversely, when an Indonesian official strategically denounces U.S. interference in Indonesia’s internal affairs in order to affirm Indonesian sovereignty, that denunciation does not invoke any particular features of the United States. Any country’s interference would be denounced in much the same way—Indonesian attacks on Australia for the latter’s involvement in East Timor are a case in point.

Indonesia and the United States are simply quite distant both from each other and from those current centers of conflict that generate many of the negative schemas about the United States, in particular the Palestine-Israel conflict. Of course, people can refer to historical frameworks that have their home elsewhere, as when Indonesian or American Muslims complain of U.S. Middle East policies, but these complaints do not have the same edge, rarely include personal knowledge, and do not relate to everyday life in a very pressing way. They are thus more likely to change quickly, or not to lead to action.

Consider how sheer distance or proximity makes a difference in these sentiments elsewhere. The relative proximity of Muslim-majority countries to France or Spain makes Muslim anti-Americanism in those counties very different from Muslim anti-
Americanism in the United States. The U.S. version is not fed by constant travel between regions, and the conflicts referred to in these schemas—in Palestine, Chechnya, or indeed against governments of Muslim-majority countries—are much farther away, subjectively as well as geographically.

Indonesians do have an inherited set of images about the Dutch and the Japanese that involve tangible memories or tales told by parents. During the Suharto years, the Japanese provided displaced targets for anti-Chinese sentiments (anti-Chinese demonstrations against Indonesian Chinese would have been severely repressed). Lingering anti-Japanese feelings could be mobilized for these demonstrations. Until recently, anti-Americanism has had very little such local historical purchase in Indonesia, CIA involvement in the 1965–66 massacres aside.

Nor is there deep anti-Americanism in neighboring Malaysia, despite former Prime Minister Mahathir’s fulminations against George Soros. One anthropologist reported to me that anti-Americanism only concerns foreign policy, and even then has led to no graffiti or demonstrations: “It is all in thought and casual comments.” Opinions are very policy-specific. For example, many on the faculty of the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur wanted George W. Bush to win the 2004 U.S. presidential election because they were afraid that if Kerry were president he would try to reverse the outsourcing of information technology work to Asia. On political issues, however, they all thought Bush was terrible, and these feelings were all about Iraq and not about American society: “They were not deep. People see CNN, and it shows the images that stoke these feelings—and it is CNN images and not those on al-Jazeera.”

Some regions may share internally more in the way of schemas about the United States than do others. It seems that there are more broadly shared negative attitudes toward America in the Arab world than in Europe, a difference that probably has most to do with (a) the importance of the Israeli-Palestine conflict for opinion in the Arabic-speaking Middle East, (b) the long history of anti-Americanism in certain European countries and consequently greater opportunity for the development of country-specific complaints and tropes, and (c) the sharp and equally long-term differences among European countries on issues that are also implicated in anti-Americanism, such as political philosophy and the role of religion.

The approach I have tried to illustrate here adds an ethnographic dimension to survey data on attitudes and genealogical accounts of tropes through time. It asks how people combine and deploy schemas in response to particular events. The three kinds of evidence—survey, genealogy, ethnography—allow us to “triangulate” on local understandings of global phenomena. Indonesians responded to 9/11 and the post-tsunami aid by acknowledging what happened but at the same time drawing on schemas about U.S. imperialism and Jewish control of foreign policy. These schemas have their own genealogies in the intellectual pilgrimages of Indonesian Muslim leaders. However, the sharp rises and falls in attitudes toward the United States

suggest that most people either do not find these schemas deeply persuasive or that they also follow other, more positive schemas.

France shows similar filtering of accounts through the lens of a schema about U.S. imperialism, one that also assumes that Americans do everything nearly perfectly: How did they convince everyone to lie about the Pentagon crash? The schema of American technical perfection has a long French history, as Roger shows, and it facilitates conspiracy theories. The diacritic use of these schemas is particularly characteristic of France (and perhaps, conversely, of the use of anti-French images by Americans) and explains the attractiveness of schemas of disorderly “Anglo-Saxon societies” and greedy imperialistic ones to politicians and other public figures. They resonate because they are, in the end, more about France than about America.